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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON THE EFFECT OF TAX EXEMPTION ON COMETITIVENESS,
PERFORMANCE AND PORTFOLIO RISK OF CREDIT UNIONS AND
SUBCHAPTER S BANKS
by
Ajeet Jain
Florida International University, 2012
Miami, Florida
Professor Arun J. Prakash, Major Professor
The tax exemptions granted to financial institutions like Subchapter S banks and
credit unions cost billions of dollars to the government. The dissertation investigates the
effect of tax exemption on competitiveness, performance and portfolio risk of credit
unions and Subchapter S banks. The methodologies include difference in differences
estimation, univariate and multivariate analysis.
The first essay entitled “The tax exemption to Subchapter S banks: who gets the
benefit?” investigates the effect of tax exemption to Subchapter S banks on stakeholders
and on job creation. Specifically, we investigate the effect of adoption of Subchapter S
status on the four stakeholders of the banks: the customers of the bank, the employees of
the bank, the owners of the bank and the government. The results indicate that the tax
exemptions to Subchapter S banks do not create new jobs, and that the owners of the
bank are the sole beneficiary of the tax exemptions since there is a significant increase in
bank’s return on equity after it adopts the Subchapter S status.

v

The second essay entitled “A comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S
banks: who shares higher tax benefits with customers?” examines whether credit unions
are doing a better job of sharing the tax benefit with its customers. The results indicate
that the credit union members do not receive the benefit in terms of lower loan rates,
higher deposit rates or lower service charges. The findings also indicate that tax
exemptions have been directed to support inefficient operations.
The third essay entitled “Asset quality comparison between credit unions and
Subchapter S banks” compares the asset quality of for-profit Subchapter S banks with
not-for-profit credit unions. The results indicate that credit unions have better asset
quality, but Subchapter S banks are superior in utilizing assets and generating higher net
interest margin.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The tax exemption offered to Subchapter S banks and credit unions has resulted in
the loss of revenues to the government; therefore it becomes economically important to
investigate who is really benefitting from these exemptions. If this benefits the borrowers
(depositors) in the form of lower (higher) loan (deposit) rates, creates more jobs, results
in better salary and benefits to the employees etc., it definitely has tremendous social
value. If, however, this (the tax exemption) results in ‘fattening the wallets’ of the
owners or inefficient operations without any societal benefits as a whole, then these tax
exemptions contribute

to the so-called

“one of the many tax loop-holes.”

The

dissertation investigates the effect of tax exemption on competitiveness, performance and
asset quality of credit unions and Subchapter S banks.
In Essay 1, entitled “The tax exemption to Subchapter S banks: who gets the
benefit?” we investigate the effect of tax exemption to Subchapter S banks on the
stakeholders of the bank and on job creation. We empirically investigate where the tax
subsidy to the Subchapter S banks is flowing. We identify four primary stakeholders of a
bank: owners, customers, employees and the government (which gives tax relief to these
banks). The owners of the bank are benefitted if the return on equity is higher after the
adoption of Subchapter S status. The customers are benefitted if the borrowers receive
lower loan rates and/or the depositors receive higher deposit rates. The employees of the
bank are benefitted if there is an increase in the salaries and benefits for the employees
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after the adoption of Subchapter S status. The government is benefitted if it achieves its
objective of generating higher employment opportunities at these banks.
We use difference in differences methodology to measure the effect of adoption
of Subchapter S status. We find that the tax exemption has neither benefitted the bank
customers in the form of higher deposit rates or lower loan rates nor the employees in the
form of increased salaries and/or benefits. Our results show that tax exemption does not
lead to any increase in employment opportunities in banks after they adopt the
Subchapter S status. In fact, our findings indicate that the shareholders or the owners of
the bank are the sole beneficiary of tax benefits since the bank’s return on equity
increases significantly after it adopts the Subchapter S status. Furthermore, we also find
that the growth of assets for Subchapter S banks is not significantly different from nonSubchapter S banks.
In Essay 2, entitled “A comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: who
shares higher tax benefits with customers?” we investigate if federally chartered credit
unions are doing a better job of sharing the tax benefit with their customers. The credit
unions are also exempted from federal taxation at corporate level just like Subchapter S
banks. However, there is a key difference between the two regarding taxation of retained
earnings. Unlike Subchapter S banks, credit unions do not pay taxes on retained earnings.
The credit unions have defended its special tax exemption of retained earnings on the
pretext of their not-for-profit nature and claims that credit unions have a special purpose
of serving individuals of limited means. We compare credit unions and Subchapter S
banks to investigate which of the two financial institutions shares higher tax benefit with
customers by comparing the loan rates, deposit rates and fee charges. We also compare
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the return on equity, return on assets, wage-salary-travel expenses and operating expenses
to investigate if the tax exemptions have been used to support inefficient operations. We
find that the tax exemption to credit unions has not resulted in benefits to its borrowers
(depositors) in the form of lower (higher) loan (deposit) rates. We find that the credit
union members pay higher service charges and fees compared to the customers of the
Subchapter S banks. We also find that credit unions have higher operating expenses
compared to Subchapter S banks. Credit unions have lower return on equity as well as
lower return on assets compared to Subchapter S banks, indicating inefficient operations.
In Essay 3, entitled “Asset quality comparison between credit unions and Subchapter
S banks” we compare the asset quality of financial institutions that have similar tax
exemptions but different ownership structure and objectives. The asset quality of
financial institutions has gained increased focus in the wake of the financial crisis of
2008-2009. The objective of for-profit Subchapter S banks is to maximize the wealth of
the shareholders, whereas the objective of not-for-profit credit unions is to serve the
people of the community who have limited means and limited access to finances. The
objective of the financial institution can influence its asset portfolio. Subchapter S banks
can make risky loans in order to maximize shareholder’s wealth, whereas credit unions
can add risk to their asset portfolio by serving customers of limited means. We compare
three different measures of asset quality for the credit unions and Subchapter S banks.
These asset quality measures are allowance for loan losses as a percentage of total loans,
net charge offs as a percentage of average assets, and nonperforming assets as a
percentage of total assets. Since net interest margin has a negative relationship with asset
quality, we compare it for credit unions and Subchapter S banks as an indirect measure
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for asset quality. We find that the Subchapter S banks have higher allowance of loans and
lease losses and higher non-performing assets. There is no significant difference in net
charge-off at the two institutions. We also find that net interest margin is higher at
Subchapter S banks. Overall, we find that that the asset quality is better at credit unions.
The findings of the dissertation can have significant policy implications about the
ongoing debate if tax exemptions to Subchapter S banks and credit unions are justified or
create any value particularly in times of record budget deficits. This study extends the
existing literature on financial institutions by investigating the effect of tax exemption on
job creation, competitiveness, performance and asset quality of credit unions and
Subchapter S banks.

4

CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1
THE TAX EXEMPTIONS TO SUBCHAPTER S BANKS: WHO GETS THE
BENEFIT?
2.1. Introduction
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 allows banks to convert to Scorporations and avoid double taxation. The corporation is treated as a partnership for tax
purposes and the shareholders pay federal income taxes on pass through earnings, and
thus avoid taxes at the corporate level1. Since 1997, a large number of banks in the U.S.
have elected Subchapter S tax treatment to reap the benefits of tax exemption. The
number has increased steadily from 606 in 1997 to over 2300 banks in 2010, (see Figure
1) resulting in major loss of tax revenues to the government. In June 2011, in a letter to
the Senate’s banking committee, Dan Berger, the executive vice president of government
affairs at the National Association of Federal Credit Unions (NAFCU), states that the tax
break to Subchapter S banks is worth more than $2 billion2. Since the tax exemption to
Subchapter S banks has resulted in the loss of revenues to the government, it becomes
economically important to investigate who is really benefitting from this exemption. If
this results in creation of more jobs, better salary and benefits to the employees etc., it
definitely have tremendous social value. If, however, this (the tax exemption) results in
1

The favorable tax treatment should allure all banks to adopt the Subchapter S status but there is certain
criterion that has to be met in order to qualify as Subchapter S institution. The restrictions include limits to
one class of stock and on the type and the number of shareholders. The Subchapter S bank can have no
more than 100 shareholders and its only shareholders are individuals, estates, exempt organizations
described in section 401(a) or 501(c)(3) or certain trusts described in section 1361(c)(2)(A).
2

http://www.nafcu.org/Tertiary.aspx?id=23056
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‘fattening the wallets’ of the owners without any societal benefits as a whole, then this
act will also contribute to the so called one of the many tax loop-holes.
The tax exemption to Subchapter-S banks at the corporate level clearly offers a
competitive advantage over C corporation banks, as Subchapter S banks can afford to
offer higher deposit rates and lower loan rates to its customers and a lower spread would
make Subchapter S banks more competitive. As a result of tax exemptions, Subchapter S
banks have more cash at hand that can be used to offer better services to customers like
multichannel access, internet banking etc., which will result in higher operating expenses.
The tax advantage can also be utilized to hire and expand the competitive workforce.
Also, the money saved as a result of tax exemption, could fuel bank’s growth. In this
study we investigate where the tax subsidy is flowing and establish if tax exemptions for
the Subchapter S banks are socially beneficial. We also investigate if the tax exemption
to Subchapter S banks leads to any increase in the number of people employed by the
bank. The findings of our paper also contribute to the ongoing debate, if tax exemption to
businesses leads to job creation.
We use the Ashenfelter and Card’s (1985) difference in differences (DID)
methodology to measure the changes in the bank due to its adoption of Subchapter S
status3. The difference in differences methodology helps us investigate if there is a
difference in the variables of interest as a result of adoption of Subchapter S status by
banks in the transition group by comparing it with banks in the control group. Our
treatment group consists of banks that have adopted Subchapter S status whereas the
3

This makes sure that the measured changes are due to adoption to Subchapter S and not due to economic
and other market factors.
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control group consists of banks that have not adopted this (Subchapter S) status. The
control group is perfectly matched with the treatment group based on bank’s location and
size.
We investigate the effect of adoption of Subchapter S status on the four
stakeholders of the banks - the customers, employees, owners and the government. The
customers comprises of both, the borrowers as well as the depositors. In this study we
investigate the following:
•

First we investigate whether the tax subsidy is passed on to the borrowers
(depositors) in the form of lower (higher) loan (deposit) rates. We find that
bank customers, both the depositors as well as the borrowers, do not
receive any benefit as a result of adoption of Subchapter S status.

•

Second, we investigate if the tax subsidy has resulted in an increase in
salaries and benefits for the Subchapter S bank employees or better
services to the customers. Note that salaries and benefits are explicitly
observable variables whereas the benefit to customers can be gauzed by
using the operating expenses as a proxy. An increase (decrease or same) in
operating expenses will signal a better (worse or same) service to the
customer. That is, if the operating expenses excluding the wage/salary
expenses are higher after the conversion, it would signal in a proliferation
in better operating environment and facilities for the employees and the
customers. We find that the tax subsidy has not resulted in any increase in
wages or in operating expenses.
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•

Third, we investigate the effect of tax exemption on the owners or the
shareholders of the bank. The owners are benefitted if the conversion to
Subchapter S results in higher growth in assets or higher return on equity.
We find that the tax subsidy does not influence the growth in bank’s
assets. However, the return on equity increases significantly after the bank
adopts the Subchapter S status, indicating that the tax benefit is passed on
to the owners of the Subchapter S banks in the form of higher return on
equity.

•

Finally, we investigate the effect of bank’s adoption of Subchapter S status
on the fourth stakeholder-the government which provides the tax benefit
and considers that tax cuts would create jobs thus improving the economy.
We investigate if conversion to Subchapter S status leads to an increase in
the number of employees. Our results show that the change in the number
of employees for the Subchapter S banks is statistically not different from
the change in the number of employees for the non-Subchapter S banks.

Overall, we find that that tax exemption to Subchapter S Banks has benefitted
only the owners of the bank. The tax exemption to Subchapter S banks neither creates
any value for any of the stakeholders except possibly for the owners nor creates any
employment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide the
relevant literature and discuss the research questions. In section 3, we present the details
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about the sample construction and variables of interest. In section 4, we present the
methodology. In section 5, we present the results. In section 6, we present the conclusion.
2.2. Literature Review
To the best of our knowledge, the prior investigations on Subchapter S banks have
mainly focused on why and which banks adopt Subchapter S status. In other words,
specifically their focus has been mainly to identify the factors that influence the bank’s
decision to adopt Subchapter S status. Limited work has been done to evaluate the effect
of tax exemptions on the stakeholders of the financial institutions that adopt the
Subchapter S status.
Hodder, McAnally and Weaver (2003) investigate the motivation behind the
conversion to Subchapter S status and find that the banks elect Subchapter S status to
avoid double taxation of dividends as well as to avoid alternative minimum taxes. They
use logistic regression to show that banks are less likely to convert when conversion
restricts access to equity capital and nullifies corporate tax loss carry forwards.
Cyree, Hein and Koch (2005) investigate the other reasons beyond tax avoidance
and also examine the factors that affect the choice of Subchapter S status. They
specifically compare the characteristics of the bank that adopt Subchapter S status with
the banks that do not adopt this status and find that banks that adopt Subchapter S status
have higher dividend payout rates, higher profit growth, lower capital, and rely more on
core deposits.
Depken, Hollans, and Swidler (2010) investigate if Subchapter S banks have
shared the portion of the tax benefit with customers in the form of lower loan rates or
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higher deposit rates as compared to C banks. They compare the rates for individual
products for the Subchapter S banks and C banks by using the second quarter data for the
year 2008 and find that Subchapter-S deposit (loan) rates are equal to or lower (higher)
than similar C corporation bank rates.
None of the papers so far have investigated the effect of bank’s adoption of
Subchapter S status on all of its stakeholders. In this essay we evaluate the effect of
Subchapter S status not only on the customers of the bank but also on the employees and
owners of the bank. We also investigate if tax break to the banks lead to any increase in
employment opportunities at these banks.
2.3. Data
We collect the data on banks from Highline Financial database for the period
1997 to 2009. To ensure homogeneity in characteristics of the transition group and the
control group, our entire sample consists of banks that adopt the Subchapter S status by
the end of year 2009. The banks in the transition group are the banks which are nonSubchapter S in the year (t-1), converts to Subchapter in year (t) and maintains its
Subchapter S status in year (t+1) (See timeline below). On the other hand, the banks in
the control group are the banks which are non -Subchapter S in the year (t-1) do not adopt
Subchapter S status in year (t) and continues to be a non- Subchapter S bank in year
(t+1). However, the banks in the control group may change to Subchapter S after year
(t+1). The banks in the control group are matched with banks in the transition group
based on state and county codes as well as the size to ensure that the banks in the two
groups are located in the same area and are of the similar size. Our final sample of
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transition and control group comprises of 249 banks. The number of banks in each group
is reduced primarily because of two reasons. First, the number of banks in the control
group is limited and decreases over time. Second, we eliminate all the banks in the
transition group for which we don’t get a perfect match based on size, state and county
codes.
We collect all the relevant data from the following sources;
1.

Per capita income (Pcir) by county from the website of the US
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis

2.

Unemployment rate (Urd) from the website of US Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.

3.

The data on Metropolitan statistical area (MSA) from the website of US
Census Bureau.

The following is the description of variables we use in this study:
•

Size = log of total assets

•
•

Average loan rate (Alr) = interest and fee income on loans/total loans and
leases
Average deposit rate (Adr) = total interest expense/total deposits

•

Spread = average loan rate-average deposit rate

•

Equityr = total equity/total assets

•

Optexpense = operating expenses/total expenses

•

Wstexp(wage salary and travel expenses) = non-interest expense (salary and
employee benefits)/total expenses
Optexsal = optexpense- wstexp

•
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•

Urd = the unemployment rate of the county in which the bank is located

•

Pcir = the per capita income of the county in which bank is located

•
•

Mcode (dummy variable) = 1 if county is in metropolitan statistical area, 0,
otherwise
Scode (dummy variable) = 1 if bank is Subchapter S, 0 otherwise.

•

Reloan = total amount of real estate loans/total assets

•

Delinqr = total amount of delinquent loans and leases/total amount of loans
and leases

2.4. Methodology
Depending on the appropriateness and purpose at hand, we employ difference in
differences (DID) estimation, univariate analysis and multiple regression methodologies
to investigate our assertions.
Difference in Differences (DID) Estimation:
Difference in differences (DID) is a commonly used empirical estimation
technique to measure the effect of a treatment or impact of a change. The difference in
differences methodology helps in investigating the differences between the pre-post
period for the treatment and control groups. Gruber and Poterba (1994) used the
difference in differences methodology to analyze the impact of the change in the tax law
that was expected to increase the purchase of health insurance by self-employed
individuals than other employed individuals. Anderson and Meyer (2000) used DID
approach to examine the effect of changes in unemployment insurance payroll on a
number of outcomes in state of Washington by treating Washington state as treatment
group and all other states representing the control groups.
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We employ difference in differences methodology to observe the outcomes for
two groups in two time periods as shown in the following time-line figure below.

Group I (treatment group) is exposed to a treatment or adoption of Subchapter S
status in the second period but not in the first period. In other words, Group I consists of
banks that are non-Subchapter S in year (-1), convert to Subchapter S in year (0) and are
Subchapter S in year (+1). Group II (Control Group) is not exposed to the treatment
during either period. In other words, Group II consists of banks that are non-Subchapter S
in all the period under investigation, that is, they remain non-Subchapter S banks in
corresponding years -1, 0 and +1. We use the dummy variable Scode and assign it a
value of 1 for the banks in Group I and 0, otherwise. To obtain the corresponding control
groups for the sample of banks experiencing charter conversion, we match with banks of
similar characteristics that experienced no change of charter in the respective year. The
banks in Group I and Group II are perfectly matched based on State and County codes
and the size. We compute the change in the variables of interest from first period to
second period for both the groups. We investigate if these changes in the variables of
interest are significantly different for the two groups. The difference in differences
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methodology removes biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group that
could be the result of trends and it helps us control for macroeconomic factors like
changes in interest rates, state of economy etc.
We compute the change in different variables for the two groups between Year (-1) and
Year (+1). The list of variables used in the analysis is as follows:
•

∆Size = change in the size of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)

•

∆Equityr = change in the equity ratio of the bank from year (-1) to year
(+1)

•

∆Urd = change in the unemployment rate of the county in which the bank
is located from year (-1) to year (+1)

•

∆Pcir = change in the per capita income of the county in which the bank is
located from year (-1) to year (+1)

•

∆Delinqr = change in the proportion of delinquent loans of the bank from
year (-1) to year (+1)

•

∆Spread = change in the spread of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)

•

∆Alr = change in the average loan rate of the bank from year (-1) to year
(+1)

•

∆Reloan = change in the proportion of real estate loans of the bank from
year (-1) to year (+1)

•

∆Adr = change in the average deposit rate of the bank from year (-1) to
year (+1)

•

∆Growth = change in the growth of assets of the bank from year (-1) to
year (+1)

•

∆Optexsal = change in the operating expenses excluding wage and salary
expenses for the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)

•

∆Emp = change in the number of employees of the bank from year (-1) to
year (+1)
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•

∆Wstexp = change in the wage, salary and travel expenses for the bank
from year (-1) to year (+1)

•

∆Roe = change in the return on equity of the bank from year (-1) to year
(+1)

Univariate Analysis:
Our goal is to test if the ratios for the Subchapter S bank structure ( μ1 ) are
different from the ratios of the non-Subchapter S structure ( μ 2 ). Hence we test the
following null-hypothesis:
∶

0

∶

0

Against the alternative hypothesis:

We first determine whether the population variances are statistically equal using
the Snedecor’s F-test. If we find that the population variances are statistically same then
we use the standard two-independent sample t-test to test the null hypothesis posited
above.4 If, however, we find that the population variances are statistically unequal, we
use the two independent sample t-test for equality of population means proposed by
Satterthwaite (1946). If the null hypothesis is true, the t-statistic will have Student’s tdistribution with Welch’s (1947) “modified” degrees of freedom given by;

4

For the test statistics and procedures to test the equality of two population variances and the equality of
two population means when population variances are unknown but equal see any basic standard statistics
textbook.
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2

 s12 s 22 
 + 
 n1 n 2 
df =
2
s12 n1
s2 n
+ 2 2
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n2

(

) (

)

2

where ni and s i2 (i = 1,2) respectively are the sample size and the sample variance of the

ith sample.
Regression Analysis:
Similar to Mayne (1977) and Thomson (1991), in our regression analysis we
provide control of the local economy in which the banks compete, namely, the county
unemployment rate, the per-capita income of the county, and whether or not the bank is
in a metropolitan area. We control for the size of the bank because economies of scale are
experienced by banks as they grow larger which will affect the spread and other variables
included in the study5. We control for delinquency ratio as it is an indicator of the quality
of bank’s loan portfolio and will affect the spread and average loan rates for the bank. We
also control for the amount of real estate loan as variation in product mix can affect
average loan and average deposit rates.
To investigate if the Subchapter S bank is passing on the tax benefits to its
customers, we estimate the parameters of the regression equation given in equation (2.1).
Here, we regress change in spread (∆Spread) as the dependent variable over a dummy
variable Scode which takes a value 1 for Subchapter S bank (Group I) and a value 0 for
non-Subchapter S banks (Group II). We investigate the significance of the dummy

5

Hughes et al (2001) find that large banks face significant scale economies that increase with bank size.
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variable Scode. A negative and significant coefficient on Scode will indicate that spread
reduces more for the Subchapter S banks than for the banks in the control group.
Essentially we estimate the parameters of the regression equation.
Δ Spread = α + β 1 Δ Size + β 2 Δ Re loan + β 3 Δ Equityr + β 4 Δ Urd +

β 5 Δ Pcir + β 6 Scode + β 7 Mcode + β Δ Delinqr + ε
8

(2.1)

A change in the spread as a result of Subchapter S conversion does not
specifically tell us if change to Subchapter S status has affected loan or deposit rates. In
order to find this we regress change in average loan rate (∆Alr) and change in average
deposit rate (∆Adr) as the dependent variable to analyze if there is a significant difference
between the change in the average loan rate and the change in average deposit rate for the
two groups. A lower loan rate and a higher deposit rate will make the Subchapter S bank
more competitive.

We use the following equations (2.2) and (2.3) to compare the

changes in the average loan and average deposit rates for the two groups.
ΔAlr = α + β1ΔSize + β 2 Δ Re loan + β3ΔEquityr + β 4 ΔUrd + β5ΔPcir +

β6 Scode + β 7 Mcode + β ΔDelinqr + ε

(2.2)

8

ΔAdr = α + β1ΔSize + β 2 Δ Re loan + β3ΔEquityr + β 4 ΔUrd + β5ΔPcir +

β6 Scode + β 7 Mcode + β ΔDelinqr + ε
8

(2.3)

The owner of Subchapter S bank may utilize the tax subsidy to make higher
reinvestments which may in turn lead to higher growth in assets. We use the regression
equation (2.4) to examine if the growth for the Subchapter S banks is higher than the
growth in the non-Subchapter S banks.

17

ΔGrowth = α + β 1 ΔSize + β 2 Δ Re loan + β 3 ΔEquityr + β 4 ΔUrd + β 5 ΔPcir
+ β 6 Scode + β 7 Mcode + β 8 ΔDelinqr + ε

(2.4)

The owner of Subchapter S bank may utilize the tax benefit to offer higher wage
salary and travel benefits (Wstexp) to its employees. Using equation (2.5) we examine if
there is a significant increase in the wages, salary and travel expenses for the Subchapter
S banks as compared to the non-Subchapter S banks.
ΔWst exp = α + β 1 ΔSize + β 2 Δ Re loan + β 3 ΔEquityr + β 4 ΔUrd + β 5 ΔPcir +

β 6 Scode + β 7 Mcode + β ΔDelinqr + ε
8

(2.5)

If Subchapter S banks use the tax dollars in improving the work environment of
their employees or in providing better facilities and services to their customers then the
Subchapter S banks will have higher operating expenses as compared to the nonSubchapter S banks. The Optexsal variable includes expenses related to the use of
premises, equipment, furniture, etc., but it does not include the salaries and benefits of
employees of the bank. We use the equation (2.6) to examine if there is a significant
difference between the changes in the operating expenses (∆Optexsal) for Subchapter S
banks as compared to the non-Subchapter S banks.
ΔOptexsal = α + β1 ΔSize + β 2 Δ Re loan + β 3 ΔEquityr + β 4 ΔUrd + β 5 ΔPcir +

β 6 Scode + β 7 Mcode + β ΔDelinqr + ε
8

(2.6)

There is an ongoing debate that tax benefits to businesses leads to job creation.
We investigate if the tax benefits extended to Subchapter S banks have been utilized to
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hire more employees. We use the equation (2.7) to examine if there is a significant
difference between the changes in the number of employees (∆Emp) for the two groups.
ΔEmp = α + β 1 ΔSize + β 2 Δ Re loan + β 3 ΔEquityr + β 4 ΔUrd + β 5 ΔPcir +

β 6 Scode + β 7 Mcode + β ΔDelinqr + ε

(2.7)

8

Finally, we investigate if the tax subsidy to Subchapter S has benefitted the
owners or shareholders of the bank. The shareholders of the Subchapter S banks are
benefitted if there is a significant increase in the return on equity as a result of adoption
of Subchapter S status. We use the equation (2.8) to examine if there is a significant
difference between the changes in the return on equity (∆Roe) for the two groups.
ΔRoe = α + β1 ΔSize + β 2 Δ Re loan + β 3 ΔEquityr + β 4 ΔUrd + β 5 ΔPcir +

β 6 Scode + β 7 Mcode + β ΔDelinqr + ε
8

(2.8)

2.5. Results and Analysis
In Table 1, we present only the relevant descriptive statistics such as means and
standard deviations for the two groups used in the analysis. The change in size for the
banks in the control group and the change in size for the banks in the treatment group are
presented. The change in equity ratio is negative for the control group in contrast to the
treatment group where the change in equity ratio is positive, indicating that shareholders
increase their reinvestment as the bank converts to Subchapter S. The change in the
proportion of real estate loans is positive for the control group and the treatment group,
indicating an increase in the proportion of real estate loans.

The change in the

delinquency ratio is negative for both the groups indicating an improvement in asset
quality over time. The change in per capita income rate and the unemployment rate is
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exactly same for the two groups, confirming that the banks in the two groups have been
matched based on geographical location.
In Table 2, we present the univariate analysis of the variables of interest. We find that
the change in spread for the treatment group is not significantly different from the change
in spread of the control group. We also find that the change in the average deposit rate
(∆Adr) and the average loan rate (∆Alr) are not statistically different for the two groups.
The banks in the treatment group experience a negative growth, but this growth is not
significantly different from the growth in assets of the control group. The change in the
wage salary expenses (∆Wstexp) and the change in operating expenses (∆Optexsal) for
the two groups are not significantly different from each other. There is an ongoing debate
that tax exemption to businesses lead to higher employment. This does not seem to hold
true for banks. We observe that the change in the number of employees (∆Emp) is not
significantly different for the treatment group banks and the control group banks. We find
that the return on equity (∆Roe) is much higher for the treatment group and the difference
is statistically significant.
In Table 3, we present the results of the regression analysis on the variables of interest
reported in Table 2. Each of the variables ∆Spread, ∆Alr, ∆Adr, ∆Growth, ∆Wstexp,
∆Optexsal, ∆Emp are regressed on the set of control variables and the Scode dummy,
which takes value of 1 for the sample of Subchapter S banks, and of 0 for matched
sample of non-Subchapter S banks. The Scode dummy coefficient indicates differences
resulting from adoption of Subchapter S status. The independent variables are used to
control for change in size, change in unemployment rate, change in delinquency ratio,
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and change in proportion of real estate loans, change in equity ratio and for metropolitan
statistical area.
We find the coefficient on Scode to be statistically insignificant in the change in
spread (∆Spread) regression (equation 2.1), indicating that there is no difference in the
change in the spread between the treatment group and the control group. Hence the tax
exemption to Subchapter S banks does not result in lower spread. The negative and a
significant coefficient on ∆Size show that as the size of the bank increases, the spread
reduces. The negative and significant coefficient on ∆Equityr indicates that the spread
reduces with the increase in the investment from the shareholders. The negative and
significant coefficient on ∆Urd indicates a negative relationship between unemployment
and spread. The coefficient on ∆Delinqr is positive and significant indicating that an
increase in riskier loans leads to higher Spread.
We find the coefficient on Scode to be insignificant for the regression equations (2.2)
and (2.3). This confirms the univariate results that there is no difference in the change in
the average loan and change in the average deposit rates between the treatment and the
control groups. These results indicate that the tax benefit is not passed on to the
borrowers by Subchapter S banks in the form of lower loan rates or to the depositors in
the form of higher deposit rates. Our results confirm the findings of Depken, Hollans, and
Swidler (2010), who find no significant difference in the loan and deposit rates of
Subchapter S banks compared to non- Subchapter S banks.
The coefficient on Scode is insignificant for change in growth (∆Growth) regression
(equation 2.4) which indicates that the growth of the banks which convert to Subchapter
S is not significantly different from the growth of the banks in the control group. The
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result of growth regression offer support to the findings of Cyree, Hein and Koch (2005)
that banks that convert to Subchapter S banks have higher dividend payout rates, hence
the tax exemption do not result in higher growth for Subchapter S banks.
The results for change in wage, salary and travel expenses regression (equation
2.5) confirms that the employees of the Subchapter S banks do not receive higher salaries
and employee benefits as the coefficient on Scode is insignificant. The result suggests
that the tax exemptions to Subchapter S banks have not been passed to the employees of
the Subchapter S banks in the form of higher salaries and wages.
The results for change in operating expense regression (equation 2.6) indicates
that the change in operating expenses for the treatment group is not significantly different
from change in operating expenses for the control group as the coefficient on Scode is
insignificant. So, the tax exemption to Subchapter S banks has not been used to offer
better services to customers or to provide better work environment for the employees.
Surprisingly, the results of the univariate analysis indicate that the increase in the
number of employees is higher for the control group as compared to the treatment group,
whereas one would expect the other way around, that is an increase in the number of
employees for the treatment group be higher because of reduced taxes. However, the
coefficient on Scode is statistically insignificant for the change in number of employees
(∆Emp) regression (equation 2.7) and it suggest that the change in the number of
employees for the treatment group is not significantly different from the control group.
The regression results suggest that the tax subsidy to Subchapters S banks has not
resulted in higher employment.
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Finally, we regress the change in the return on equity (∆Roe) on the Scode
dummy and the set of control variables (equation 2.8). We find that the coefficient on
Scode is positive and highly significant at 1 percent level. The regression results confirm
that the change in the return on equity for the treatment group is significantly different
from the control group. The tax exemption to Subchapter S banks has resulted in higher
return on equity for its shareholders.
Overall, the univariate results in Table 2 and the regression results in Table 3
suggest that the tax benefits to Subchapter S banks do not create any value for the
customers or the employees of the bank. The results suggest that the shareholders or the
owners of the Subchapter S banks with higher return on equity are the sole beneficiary of
tax exemptions. Moreover, we find that tax exemptions to Subchapter S banks do not
create jobs.
2.6. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the effect of bank’s adoption to the Subchapter S
status on its stakeholders which we identify as, the bank owners, bank’s customers,
employees of bank and the government (which gives tax relief to these banks). Using a
unique dataset that provides detailed information about the year of adoption of
Subchapter S status by banks, we use difference-in-differences estimation to investigate
the effect of Subchapter S status adoption on stakeholders of the bank.
We compare the changes in the banks that adopt the Subchapter S status with
those banks that do not adopt Subchapter S status in the same time period and measure
the effect of tax break on the Subchapter S banks. First, we find that the customers i.e. the
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depositors and the borrowers of the Subchapter S banks do not receive the benefit of tax
exemption in the form of higher deposit rates or lower loan rates.
Second, the tax exemptions to Subchapter S banks do not lead to higher employment
opportunities by these banks. The findings could have significant policy implications
about the ongoing debate if tax exemptions to businesses create jobs.
Third, the shareholders or the owners of the bank are the beneficiary of the tax
exemptions offered to Subchapter S banks. Therefore, we conclude that tax exemption to
Subchapter S banks does not create any difference in their operations and these banks
would have functioned and grown similar to the non-Subchapter S banks even without
tax subsidy and tax subsidy to Subchapter S banks do not create jobs.
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Figure 1: Growth of Subchapter S Banks in US

Year

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

# of Active Banks

9711

9321

9122

8840

8592

8381

8255

8178

8056

7922

7788

7569

7321

6999

# of Subchapter S

606

1048

1289

1447

1641

1804

1959

2070

2178

2286

2381

2421

2399

2344

Percentage S Banks

6.24

11.24

14.13

16.37

19.10

21.52

23.73

25.31

27.04

28.86

30.57

31.99

32.77

33.49
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Table 1: The relevant descriptive statistics for Subchapter S and non-Subchapter S banks
This table shows the mean and standard deviation of changes in the basic characteristics
for Subchapter S and non-Subchapter S banks. All the variables are explained below this
table.

Variable
ΔSize
ΔEquityr
ΔUrd
ΔPcir
ΔReloan
ΔDelinqr
# of banks

Subchapter S banks
(Treatment Group)
Mean
Std Dev
0.0597
0.0034
0.2944
1970.3700
0.0358
-0.0005

0.0775
0.0137
1.1387
1406.8000
0.0597
0.0045

non-Subchapter S banks
(Control Group)
Mean
Std Dev
0.0678
-0.0001
0.2944
1970.3700
0.0269
-0.0008

249

0.0939
0.0379
1.1387
1406.8000
0.0593
0.0068

249

Note: The change in the unemployment rate (ΔUrd) and the change in per capita income
rate (ΔPcir) is exactly same for the two groups since the banks in the two groups have
been matched based on geographical location.
ΔSize = change in the size of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔEquityr = change in the equity ratio of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔUrd = change in the unemployment rate of the county in which the bank is located from
year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔPcir = change in the per capita income of the county in which the bank is located from
year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔReloan = change in the proportion of real estate loans of the bank from
year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔDelinqr = change in the proportion of delinquent loans of the bank from
year (-1) to year (+1)
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Table 2: Comparison of Subchapter S and non-Subchapter S banks: univariate analysis
This table presents the mean and standard deviation of the changes in the variables of interest for the Subchapter S banks and the
matched sample of non-Subchapter S banks. Difference-in- differences are shown in column 3 with respective p-values. *, ** and
*** denote significant differences between the samples means at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Variable
ΔSpread
ΔAdr
ΔAlr
ΔGrowth
ΔWstexp
ΔOptexsal
ΔEmp
ΔRoe***
# of banks

Subchapter S banks
Mean
Std Dev
-0.0005
0.0355
-0.0059
0.0359
-0.0064
0.0115
-0.0022
0.0108
0.0296
0.0614
0.0058
0.0206
3.1285
13.1538
4.7589
5.2407

Non Subchapter S banks
Mean
Std Dev
-0.0031
0.0382
-0.0034
0.0365
-0.0065
0.0127
-0.0008
0.0156
0.0305
0.0621
0.0049
0.0186
4.6867
15.5695
0.4957
5.0342

249

Sub S-Non Sub S
Difference
p-value
0.0026
0.4367
-0.0025
0.4383
0.0001
0.9254
-0.0013
0.2774
-0.0009
0.8705
0.0009
0.5943
-1.5582
0.2282
4.2632
0.0001

249

ΔSpread = change in the spread of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔAlr = change in the average loan rate of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔAdr = change in the average deposit rate of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔGrowth = change in the growth of assets of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔWstexp = change in the wage, salary and travel expenses for the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔOptexsal = change in the operating expenses excluding wage and salary expenses for the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔEmp = change in the number of employees of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
ΔRoe = change in the return on equity of the bank from year (-1) to year (+1)
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Table 3: The effect of Subchapter S Status on stakeholders
This table presents the results of the regression equation with ΔSpread(in equation 2.1), ΔAlr(in 2.2), ΔAdr(in 2.3), ΔGrowth(in
2.4), ΔWstexp(in 2.5), ΔOptexsal(in 2.6), ΔEmp(in 2.7) and ΔRoe(in 2.8) as the dependent variable. Each of the dependent
variable is explained in the paper. The regression coefficients on selected variables and their significance for the sample of
Subchapter S and non-Subchapter S banks are presented. The independent variables are used to control for change in size,
unemployment rate, delinquency ratio, proportion of real estate loans, equity ratio and metropolitan statistical area. Note that the
dependent variables are same in each of the equations because our interest is in dummy variable Scode and its significance with
respect to the dependent variables. The variable of interest is the Scode dummy, which takes value of 1 for Subchapter S banks,
and of 0 for matched sample of non-Subchapter S banks. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Equation
Number
Constant
Scode
ΔSize
ΔEquityr
ΔUrd
ΔPcir
ΔReloan
Mcode
ΔDelinqr
#of Obs
R-Squared

(2.1)
∆Spread

(2.2)
ΔAdr

(2.3)
ΔAlr

(2.4)
ΔGrowth

(2.5)
ΔWstexp

(2.6)
ΔOptexsal

(2.7)
ΔEmp

(2.8)
ΔRoe

-0.0018
0.0022
-0.0525**
-0.1350**
-0.0060***
0.000001
0.0224
0.0009
0.5446*

-0.0065*
-0.0019
0.0503**
0.057
0.0021
0.000000
-0.0388
0.0003
-0.1978

-0.0084***
0.0003
-0.0021
-0.078***
-0.0039***
0.000001***
-0.0163**
0.0012
0.3467***

-0.0001
-0.0007
0.047***
-0.1647***
-0.0003
0.000000
-0.0431***
-0.0014
-0.0054

0.0399***
-0.0029
-0.1280***
0.1434
0.0256***
-.000004**
0.0635
-0.0031
-0.7730***

0.0089***
0.0003
-0.0554***
0.036
0.0058***
-0.000001***
0.0094
0.0025
-0.2490**

-1.7862
-1.4725
97.8427***
147.5632***
0.3085
-0.000449
14.3276
0.5431
-57.0217

-1.1287
4.3347***
12.4743***
-5.2599
-0.5103**
0.000406**
8.1868**
-0.2512
-46.7236

498
0.0208

498
0.2671

498
0.1642

498
0.3126

498
0.2489

498
0.2656

498
0.2446

498
0.0673
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CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2
A COMPARISON OF CREDIT UNIONS AND SUBCHAPTER S BANKS: WHO
SHARES HIGHER TAX BENEFIT WITH CUSTOMERS?

3.1. Introduction
The Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 establishes credit unions as institutions that
provide financial services to people with limited access and limited means. The federal
credit unions are exempted from federal income tax and do not pay taxes on the retained
earnings. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 allows banks to convert to Scorporations and avoid double taxation just like credit unions. However, unlike credit
unions, the shareholders of the Subchapter S banks have to pay taxes on the retained
earnings. The credit unions have defended their special tax exemption of retained
earnings on the pretext of their not-for-profit nature and claims that credit unions have a
special purpose of serving individuals of limited means.
In this essay we compare credit unions and Subchapter S banks to investigate who
does a better job in passing a portion of the tax benefits to its customers. In the absence of
any direct measurement of the flow of tax subsidy we rely on proxies to measure if the
benefits are passed on to the customers or are used to support inefficient operations. That
is, if the benefits are passed to the borrowers they will benefit in the form of lower loan
rates and depositors receiving higher rates on their deposits. Furthermore, the customers
will supposedly benefit if the service fee charges are lower. We further investigate if tax
exemptions are used to support inefficient operations by comparing the return on equity,
return on assets, wage-salary-travel expenses as well as operating expenses. Higher
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wage-salary-travel expenses and higher operating expenses would mean that tax benefit
has been directed to support operations. A lower return on equity as well as on assets
would indicate inefficient operations.
The supporters of tax exemption to credit unions argue that credit unions have
provided a valuable alternative to the for-profit banking system and serves people who
have no or limited access to other financial services6.However, the American Bankers
Association argues that Subchapter-S banks, unlike credit unions, still must pay taxes on
retained earnings and demands that credit unions should also be taxed on the retained
earnings.7. The credit unions assert that the portion of the institution’s retained earnings is
used to meet the capital requirements or capital adequacy ratios8. Credit unions also argue
that if credit unions lose their tax-exempt status, credit unions will have to pass along the
burden of tax payments to their members9. The findings of our paper have significant
policy implications, as the tax exemption to credit unions is being questioned and
scrutinized. The Tax Reform Subcommittee of the President's Economic Recovery
Advisory Board (PERAB) has listed the option of eliminating tax expenditures like the
credit union federal income tax exemption as one of the options for reforming corporate
taxation10.
6

. U.S. Department of the Treasury “Comparing Credit Unions and Other Depository Institutions”, January
2001. Page 28.)
7

American Bankers Association, 2009. Subchapter S Banks vs. Credit Unions: An Unfair CU Tax
Advantage. Position paper on http://www.aba.com
8 http://www.cuna.org/gov_affairs/legislative/issues/download/sub_s_banks.pdf
9 http://www.cuna.org/gov_affairs/download/Why_CUs_TaxExempt09.pdf
10 http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/report3070.aspx
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Our results indicate that in comparison to the Subchapter S banks the credit
unions have lower deposit rates and higher loan rates. We also find that the fee structure
of credit unions is not customer friendly as compared to Subchapter S banks. Moreover,
credit unions have lower return on equity as well as on assets compared to Subchapter S
banks. We also find that the credit unions have higher operating expenses as compared to
Subchapter S banks. Overall, we find that compared to credit unions, Subchapter S
banks do a better job in passing the tax benefits to their customers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide the
relevant literature and discuss the research questions. In section 3, we present the details
about the sample construction and variables of interest. In section 4, we present the
methodology. Section 5 has the results. In section 6, we present the conclusion.
3.2. Literature Review
According to Rose (1994) credit unions are granted tax-exempt status so that
credit union members receive the benefit of the tax subsidy. Credit unions have also
claimed that they pass on the tax subsidy to its customers and if they (credit unions) lose
their tax-exempt status, they will have to pass along their tax burden to their members.
Prior research has been limited in scope and size. As far as we know in this study we are
the first to compare the various attributes of tax exempted federally chartered credit
unions with their counter parts of Subchapter S banks which have similar tax exemptions.
Yvonne, Hinson and Juras (2002) argue that the credit unions are granted tax-exempt
status so that they offer lower loan rates and higher deposit rates to its members. They
compare the net interest margin of the credit unions with mutual loans and savings for the
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year 1993 and 1994 and find that credit unions are not passing along a significant portion
of their tax subsidy to members through lower interest margins but the authors did not
specifically investigate the difference in the loan and deposit rates of the two institutions.
Our study is more comprehensive as we investigate the loan/deposit rates over a longer
period of time.
Frame, Karels and McClatchey (2003) estimate a translog cost function for credit
unions and mutual thrifts to examine if the credit unions pass the tax benefits to its
customers or engage in expense preference behavior relative to mutual thrifts. They
classify federal credit unions on the basis of common bond of occupation, association, or
geographic area. It is interesting to note that the membership at credit unions is based on
affinity among members or a common bond11. The membership at occupational credit
unions is limited to individuals sharing a common employer. The members of
associational credit unions include members of a religious group or a civic group. The
membership at residential or community credit unions is limited to individuals of a
particular residential area or community. Their results are interesting as they find that
credit union industry, as a whole does not exhibit expense preference behavior. They find
that credit unions with residential common bonds have higher costs than mutual thrifts,
but single common bond occupational and associational credit unions are more cost
efficient. Our study extends their work beyond mutual thrifts and credit unions as we
compare member owned credit unions with privately owned Subchapter S banks.

11

Frame, W. S., Karels, G.V., McClatchey, C. “The Effect of the Common Bond and Membership
Expansion on Credit Union Risk”. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 2001
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Depken, Hollans, and Swidler (2010) compare the rates for individual products
for the Subchapter S banks, credit unions and C banks by using the second quarter data
for the year 2008 and find that Subchapter-S deposit (loan) rates are equal to or lower
(higher) than similar C corporation bank rates. They also find that that credit unions offer
higher deposit rates on certain products but overall the results are inconclusive. In this
paper we compare the credit unions and the Subchapter S banks over a period of six years
from 2005 to 2010. We compare the interest rate spread, average loan as well as average
deposit rates for the credit unions and Subchapter S banks. We then investigate if the
credit union charge lower service fee to its customers as compared to Subchapter S
banks. We contrast the performance of credit unions with Subchapter S banks by
comparing the return on equity as well as on assets. We also investigate if credit unions
have higher wage/salary and or operating expenses as compared to Subchapter S banks.
3.3. Data
We collect the data on Subchapter S banks from Highline Financial database and
the data for credit unions from the website of National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA). To make an even comparison we create a subsample of the federally chartered
credit unions and Subchapter S banks that have a similar customer base and market level
competition. In our sample we match the credit unions with Subchapter S banks based on
state code and county code. We find that in our period of study, quite a number of credit
unions are small without comparable Subchapter S banks. Similarly on the other side the
time period of our study consists of some credit unions that are bigger than a comparable
Subchapter S bank. Therefore, we delete institutions below $50 million and above $3
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billion from the population of credit unions and Subchapter S banks. We include only
those counties that have at least one credit union and one Subchapter S bank. In our
multivariate regressions we control for local economic factors.
We collect all the relevant data from the following sources;
1. Per capita income by county from the website of the US Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
2. Unemployment rate from the website of US Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
The following is the description of variables used in this study:
•

Size = log of total assets

•

Average loan rate (Alr) = interest and fee income on loans/total loans and leases

•

Average deposit rate (Adr) = total interest expense/total deposits

•

Spread = average loan rate-average deposit rate

•

Optexp = operating expenses/total expenses

•
•

Wstexp(wage salary and travel expenses) = non interest expense (salary and
employee benefits)/total expenses
Urr = the unemployment rate of county in which bank is located

•

Lpcir = the log of per capita income of the county in which bank is located

•

Scode (dummy variable) = 1 if bank is Subchapter S, 0 otherwise

•

Delequencyratio = total amount of delinquent loans and leases/total amount of
loans and leases

3.4. Methodology
We use the annual data for the Subchapter S banks and credit unions for the years
2005-2010 for our empirical analysis. We perform both univariate analysis as well as
cross-sectional multivariate regressions.
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Univariate Analysis:
Our goal is to test if the relevant attributes for the credit unions ( μ1 ) are different
from the corresponding attributes of the Subchapter S banks ( μ 2 ). Hence we test the
following null-hypothesis:
∶

0,

∶

0.

Against the alternative hypothesis:

We first determine whether the population variances are statistically equal using
the Snedecor’s F-test. If we find that the population variances are statistically same then
we use the standard two-independent sample t-test to test the null hypothesis posited
above.12 If, however, we find that the population variances are statistically unequal, we
use the two independent sample t-test for equality of population means proposed by
Satterthwaite (1946). If the null hypothesis is true, the t-statistic will have Student’s tdistribution with Welch’s (1947) “modified” degrees of freedom given by;
2

 s12 s 22 
 + 
 n1 n 2 
df =
2
s12 n1
s 22 n2
+
n1
n2

(

) (

12

)

2

For the test statistics and procedures to test the equality of two population variances and the equality of
two population means when population variances are unknown but equal see any basic standard statistics
textbook.
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Where ni and s i2 (i = 1,2) respectively are the sample size and the sample variance of the

ith sample.
Multivariate Analysis:
Following Mayne (1977) and Thomson (1991), in our multivariate analysis, we
use county unemployment rate and the per-capita income to control for local economic
factors. Furthermore, we control for the size because economies of scales are experienced
by banks and credit unions as they grow larger and it affects the spread and other
variables included in our study. We also control for delinquency ratio as it is an indicator
of the quality of bank’s loan portfolio and is expected to affect the spread and average
loan rates for the bank.
In equations (3.1) to (3.8) to we regress a particular dependent variable on over
a dummy variable Scode which takes a value of 0 for credit unions and a value of 1 for
Subchapter S banks as well as other independent variables e.g., Size, Urr, Lpcir and
Delequencyratio. Our variable of interest is the sign and statistical significance of the
dummy variable Scode in each case where as the other variables are the control variables,
For example in equation (3.1) we investigate the significance of the dummy variable
Scode. A positive and significant coefficient on Scode would indicate that the spread for
the credit unions is lower.
Spread = α + β1Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + β 5 Delequency ratio + ε

(3.1)

A difference in the spread does not specifically tell us about the difference in loan
or deposit rates, hence we investigate if there is a significant difference between the
average loan rate and average deposit rate between the credit unions and Subchapter S
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banks. We use, respectively, equations (3.2) and (3.3) to compare the average loan rates
and average deposit rates for the credit unions and Subchapter S banks.
Alr = α + β1Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + β 5 Delequency ratio + ε

(3.2)

Adr = α + β 1 Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + β 5 Delequency ratio + ε

(3.3)

Credit unions claim that they charge lower fee as compared to other institutions
and argue that if credit unions lose their special tax-exempt status, they will have to pass
the tax burden in higher fees to its customers. Equation (3.4) to examine if credit unions
have a lower fee structure as compared to Subchapter S banks
Servefee = α + β 1 Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + β 5 Delequency ratio + ε

(3.4)

Credit unions have more diffused ownership structure as compared to Subchapter
S banks and might be operating inefficiently. Each member of a credit union has only
one vote and do not have any control over its operations, whereas, in case of Subchapter
S banks, the large shareholders have significantly more control over the operations of the
bank. This might influence the return on equity and return on assets. We use equations
(3.5) and (3.6) to compare the return on equity and return on assets of credit unions with
Subchapter S banks.
Roe = α + β 1 Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + β 5 Delequency ratio + ε

(3.5)

Roa = α + β 1 Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + β 5 Delequency ratio + ε

(3.6)

We further investigate if the tax benefits are being directed to pay higher salaries
and/ or on higher operating expenses, using the following equation (3.7) and (3.8).
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Wst exp = α + β 1 Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + β 5 Delequency ratio + ε

(3.7)

Opt exp = α + β 1 Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + β 5 Delequency ratio + ε

(3.8)

3.5. Results and Analysis
In Table 4, we present the descriptive statistics for the size, spread, average loan
rate, average deposit rate, service fee, return on equity and return on assets, wage-salarytravel expenses and operating expenses. Our screened sample contains 1602 credit unions
and 1450 Subchapter S banks during the period of study13. We include only those
counties that have at least one credit union and one Subchapter S bank. The number of
Subchapter S banks and credit unions is different in some counties therefore the sample
sizes for credit Unions and Subchapter S banks are not same. The size of the credit
unions included in the sample varies from $50.05M to $2.95B whereas the size of the
Subchapter S banks varies from $50M to $2.93B. The mean spread for the credit unions
and Subchapter S banks are respectively 6.18 and 6.16 percent. The average loan rate for
credit unions is 8.44 percent and for the Subchapter S banks, 8.74 percent. The average
deposit rate is 2.26 percent for the credit unions and 2.57 percent for Subchapter S banks.
The mean wage-salary-and travel expenses at credit unions are 32.90 percent of total
expenses and for Subchapter S banks it is 32.52 percent. The average operating expenses
at Subchapter S banks and credit unions are respectively 8.24 percent of and 15.61
percent of the total expenses. The mean return on equity for credit unions is 6.67 percent
as compared to 14.09 percent for Subchapter S banks. The average return on assets is
1.38 percent for Subchapter S banks whereas it is only 0.75 percent for credit unions.
13

The sample contains only those institutions which have total assets between $50 million and $ 3 billion.
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In Table 5, we present the univariate analysis of the variables of interest during
the period 2005 to 2010 and for each of the individual years. We find that the spread for
the credit unions is not significantly different from the Subchapter S banks for the overall
period 2005 to 2010. However, yearly comparisons yield mixed results. The spread is
higher for the credit unions in year 2005 whereas the spread is lower for the credit unions
in the year 2008 and 2010. We find that the average loan rate is lower for Subchapter S
banks for the period 2005 to 2010. As regards yearly comparisons, average loan rate is
lower for Subchapter S banks in the year 2005, 2006 and 2007. There is no significant
difference in the years 2008 and 2009. However, Average loan rate is higher for
Subchapter S banks in the year 2010. The average deposit rate is lower for Subchapter S
banks for the period 2005 to 2010.As regards yearly comparisons; the average deposit
rate is lower for Subchapter S banks in each year except in 2009 when there is no
statistically significant difference.
We find that the return on equity and return on assets for the credit unions is
lower than the Subchapter S banks for the period 2005 to 2010 as well as for each of the
years. The wage salary expenses for the two groups are not significantly different from
each other except for year 2006 and 2007 when wage salary expenses are higher for
Subchapter S banks. Finally, the operating expenses for the credit unions are higher as
compared to Subchapter S banks for the period 2005 to 2010 and for each of the
individual years.
In Table 6, we present the results of the regression analysis on the variables of
interest reported in Table 5. Each of the variables Spread, Alr, Adr, Servefee, Roe, Roa,
Wstexp and Optexp are regressed on the set of control variables and the Scode dummy
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which takes value of 1 for the sample of Subchapter S banks, and of 0 for matched
sample of federally chartered credit unions. The independent variables are used to control
for size, unemployment rate, and delinquency ratio.
We find the coefficient on Scode to be statistically insignificant in spread
regression (equation 3.1), indicating that there is no difference in the spread of the credit
unions and Subchapter S banks.
We find the coefficient on Scode to be positive and significant for the regression
(equation 3.2) indicating that the average loan rate is higher for Subchapter S banks as
compared to credit unions. The results suggest that credit unions offer lower loan rates as
compared to Subchapter S banks.
We find the coefficient on Scode to be positive and significant for the regression
(equation 3.3), indicating that the average deposit rate is higher for Subchapter S banks
for the period 2005 to 2010. The results suggest that credit unions offer lower deposit
rates as compared to Subchapter S banks.
The coefficient on Scode is negative and significant for Servefee regression
(equation 3.4) which indicates that the credit unions on an average charge higher service
fee to its customers. The findings contradict the claim of the credit unions that they
charge lower service fee to its customers.
We regress the return on equity (Roe) on the Scode dummy and the set of control
variables (equation 3.5). We find that the coefficient on Scode is positive and significant.
The regression results indicate that the return on equity for the credit unions is
significantly less than that for Subchapter S banks. The coefficient on Scode is positive
and significant for the return on assets (Roa) regression (equation 3.6) which indicates
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that the return on assets for the credit unions is significantly less than that for Subchapter
S banks.
The results for wage, salary and travel expenses regression (equation 3.7)
indicates that there is no difference in the salaries of the employees of the credit unions
and Subchapter S banks as the coefficient on Scode is insignificant.
The results for the operating expense regression (equation 3.8) indicates that the
operating expenses for the credit unions is higher as compared to Subchapter S banks as
the coefficient on Scode is negative and significant. The higher operating expenses for
the credit unions indicate inefficient operations.
3.6. Robustness Tests
It may be argued that our results are driven by large sample size. Hence, in order
to mitigate the large sample size problem we conduct a series of regressions on the
variables of interest for each year separately.
In Table 7, we present the results of regression analysis on Spread for each year
from 2005 to 2010. The Spread is significantly higher at Subchapter S banks in the year
2006 and 2007. There is no difference in the spread in the year 2005, 2008 and 2009.
However the spread is significantly higher for credit Unions in the year 2010. The results
indicate that in 2010 the difference between the average loan rate and average deposit
rate is higher for the credit union as compared to that of Subchapter S banks.
In Table 8, we present the results of regression analysis on average loan rate (Alr).
We find that the average loan rate is higher for Subchapter S banks in the year 2005,
2006 and 2007. These results are consistent with the results for the combined period from
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2005 to 2010. However, in the year 2008 and 2009, we find no significant difference in
the average loan rate for credit unions and Subchapter S banks. We find that in the year
2010, the average loan rate is higher for credit unions. The results indicate that credit
unions used to offer lower loan rates but not anymore. In Table 9, we present the results
of regression analysis on average deposit rate (Adr) for each year from 2005 to 2010. The
results indicate that the average deposit rate offered by credit unions is lower for the year
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 and for 2009, there was no significant difference. The
regression results for the combined period from 2005 to 2010 and yearly regressions are
consistent. We find that Subchapter S banks are doing a better job of sharing the tax
benefit with the depositors in the form of higher deposit rates.
In Table 10, we present the results of regression analysis on Service fee
(Servefee) for each year from 2005 to 2010. The results indicate that the service fee
charged by credit unions is higher for each of the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and
2010. The yearly regression results are consistent with the results for the combined period
from 2005 to 2010. We find that credit unions charge higher service fee than Subchapter
S banks.
In Table 11, we present the results of regression analysis on wage, salary and
travel expenses (Wstexp) for each year from 2005 to 2010. The results indicate that there
was no statistically significant difference in the wage salary and travel expenses for the
year 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2010. However, it was higher in 2006 and 2007 for credit
unions. We find that the wage salary and travel expenses for the credit unions are similar
to that for Subchapter S banks.
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In Table 12, we present the results of regression analysis on operating expenses
(Optexp) for each year from 2005 to 2010. The results indicate that the operating
expenses are higher for credit unions for each year from 2005 to 2010. The yearly
regression results are consistent with the regression results for the combined period from
2005 to 2010.
In Table 13, we present the results of regression analysis on return on equity
(Roe) for each year from 2005 to 2010. The yearly regression results are presented in
Table 10. The results for each of the individual years from 2005 to 2010 indicate that
Subchapter S banks have significantly higher return on equity as compared to credit
unions.
In Table 14, we present the results of regression analysis on return on assets for
each year from 2005 to 2010. The results confirm that credit unions have lower return on
assets as compared to Subchapter S banks. The yearly regression results of return on
equity and return on assets are consistent and support the regression results for the overall
period from 2005 to 2010.
3.7. Conclusion
In this essay we compare not for profit credit unions with for profit Subchapter S
banks to investigate which of the two is doing a better job of sharing the tax benefit with
its customers. We conduct the analysis for the overall period from 2005- 2010 as well as
for each of the individual years separately.
We find that the credit unions do not offer lower loan rates or higher deposit rates
as compared to Subchapter S banks. The credit union customers pay a higher service fee
as compared to the customers of Subchapter S banks. We find that the operating expenses
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are higher for credit unions indicating inefficient operations. The return on equity and
return on assets is significantly higher for Subchapter S banks as compared to credit
unions indicating inefficient operations and poor asset utilization at credit unions.
Overall, we find that in comparison with credit unions, the Subchapter S banks are doing
a superior job at sharing the tax benefit with their customers.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for credit unions and Subchapter S banks
In the following table, we present the descriptive statistics for credit unions and Subchapter S banks. We match the credit unions
and Subchapter S banks based on the location to control for demographic factors. Our sample is from 2005 to 2010.

Variable
Size
Spread
Alr
Adr
Servefee
Wstexp
Optexp
Roe
Roa

Mean
306425788
0.0618345
0.0844655
0.022631
0.0153367
0.3290988
0.156186
0.0667276
0.0075564

# of Obs

1602

credit unions
Std Dev
Minimum
436205768
50055000
0.0233059
0.015813
0.0228504
0.0473648
0.0072495
0.010007
0.010567
0
0.0653102
0.000099875
0.0528422
0.0149127
0.0408156
0
0.0046757
0

Maximum
2952342000
0.1822686
0.1984057
0.0551008
0.0802977
0.5583958
0.3773304
0.4239171
0.0420052

Mean
327438358
0.0616601
0.0874353
0.0257752
0.0048679
0.3252256
0.0824777
0.1409807
0.0138001

Subchapter S banks
Std Dev
Minimum
402631424
50001000
0.021368
0.0153453
0.0209242
0.0323722
0.0100684
0.0100059
0.0173902
0
0.0780289
0.0516056
0.0309486 0.0063716
0.0831974
0
0.0084551
0

1450

Description of variables
Size = Total assets

Wstexp = wage salary and travel expenses

Spread = average loan rate-average deposit rate

Optexp = operating expenses

Alr = average loan rate

Roe = return on equity

Adr = average deposit rate

Roa = return on assets

Servefee = service fee and charges
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Maximum
2928263000
0.1862539
0.1989043
0.0898747
0.4545164
0.5793951
0.1964962
0.5856814
0.0647041

Table 5: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: univariate analysis
In the following table, we present the univariate comparisons of credit unions and Subchapter S banks from Table 4. We present
the results of t-tests on the differences in the means of the variables of interest for the period 2005 to 2010 and for each of the
Individual years. *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Differences between the Means(credit unions-Subchapter S banks)
Variable

2005-2010

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Spread

0.0002

-0.0006

-0.0046*

-0.0027

0.0032*

0.0029

0.0072***

Alr

-0.003**

-0.0029*

-0.0097***

-0.0081***

0.002

0.0028

0.0055**

Adr

-0.0031***

-0.0023***

-0.005***

-0.0054***

-0.0013***

-0.0001

-0.0017***

Servefee

0.0105***

0.0088***

0.0081***

0.0088***

0.0155**

0.011***

0.0111***

Roe

-0.0743***

-0.099***

-0.1025***

-0.084***

-0.0585***

-0.0347***

-0.0404***

Roa

-0.0062***

-0.0082***

-0.0087***

-0.0071***

-0.0046***

-0.0033***

-0.0037***

Wstexp

0.0039

-0.0069

0.0129**

0.0132**

-0.0015

0.0008

-0.0098

Optexp

0.0737***

0.0789***

0.0774***

0.0742***

0.0696***

0.0676***

0.0689***

Description of variables
Spread = average loan rate-average deposit rate

Roe = return on equity

Alr = average loan rate

Roa = return on assets

Adr = average deposit rate

Wstexp = wage salary and travel expenses

Servefee = service fee and charges

Optexp = operating expenses
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Table 6: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks for the period 2005-2010
In this table, we present the results for the regression of variables of interest on size, unemployment rate, per capita income,
delinquency ratio and a dummy variable for credit unions (dummy=0) and Subchapter S banks (dummy=1). We present the
results for the period 2005-2010. The following acronyms are used: Size (log (total assets)), Lpcir (log (per capita income)), Urr
(unemployment rate), and Delequencyratio (delinquent loans/total loans). *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1%
levels of significance.

Spread
Independent Variables:
Constant
0.1374***
Scode
0.0006
Size
-0.004***
Urr
0.0002
Lpcir
-0.0001
Delequencyratio
0.0001

0.1288***
0.0034***
-0.0033***
-0.0013***
0.0024
0.0008

-0.0087
0.0028***
0.0007***
-0.0015***
0.0025***
0.0007**

# of Obs
R-Squared

3045
0.039

3045
0.1519

3045
0.0272

Alr

Regression results 2005-2010
Adr
Servefee

Wstexp

Optexp

Roe

Roa

0.1043***
-0.0107***
0.0002
0
-0.0087***
-0.0005

0.8814***
-0.0014
-0.0075***
0.0036***
-0.0407***
-0.0107***

0.4518***
-0.0738***
-0.0019**
0.0004
-0.0247***
-0.0018

0.3641***
0.0719***
0.0106***
-0.0072***
-0.0434***
-0.0082***

0.0253***
0.006***
0.0008***
-0.0007***
-0.0028***
-0.0005

3045
0.1362

3045
0.0409

3045
0.4261

3045
0.3156

3045
0.2264

Description of variables
Spread = average loan rate-average deposit rate

Roe = return on equity

Alr = average loan rate

Roa = return on assets

Adr = average deposit rate

Wstexp = wage salary and travel expenses

Servefee = service fee and charges

Optexp = operating expenses
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Table 7: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: Spread
In this table we present the results for the regression of spread on size, unemployment rate, per capita income, delinquency ratio
and a dummy variable for credit unions (dummy=0) and Subchapter S banks (dummy=1). We present the results for each
Individual year from 2005 to 2010. The following acronyms are used: Size (log (total assets)), Lpcir (log (per capita income)), Urr
(unemployment rate), and Delequencyratio (delinquent Loans/total Loans). *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1%
levels of significance.
Regression results for Spread
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Constant

0.1587***

0.0488

0.1045**

0.2065***

0.0839

0.0126

Scode

0.0001

0.0063***

0.0035*

-0.0022

-0.0019

-0.0066***

Size

-0.0042***

-0.004***

-0.0047***

-0.0043***

-0.0035***

-0.0022*

Urr

0.0018**

0.0015

0.0009

0.0003

0.0003

0.0018***

Lpcir

-0.0024

0.0077**

0.004

-0.0062

0.0039

0.0074

Delequencyratio

0.0059

0.0007

0.0015

0.0002

-0.0013

-0.001

# of Obs

520

593

660

597

373

303

R-Squared

0.0477

0.0464

0.0378

0.0392

0.0325

0.0758

Independent Variables:
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Table 8: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: average loan rate (Alr)
In this table we present the results for the regression of average loan rate on size, unemployment rate, per capita income,
delinquency ratio and a dummy variable for credit unions (dummy=0) and Subchapter S banks (dummy=1). We present the
results for each Individual year from 2005 to 2010. The following acronyms are used: Size (log (total assets)), Lpcir (log (per
capita income)), Urr (unemployment rate), and Delequencyratio (delinquent loans/total loans). *, ** and *** denote, respectively
10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Regression results for Alr
Independent Variables:
Constant
Scode
Size
Urr
Lpcir
Delequencyratio

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

0.1363***
0.0025
-0.0035***
0.002**
0
0.0061

0.0164
0.0111***
-0.0028***
0.0016*
0.0108***
0.0009

0.0804*
0.0085***
-0.0033***
0.0016*
0.0061*
0.0023

0.202***
-0.0011
-0.0039***
0.0012*
-0.0046
0.0015

0.1081*
-0.0019
-0.0031***
0.0004
0.0027
-0.001

0.0192
-0.0051**
-0.0021*
0.0018***
0.0079
-0.0003

# of Obs

520

593

660

597

373

303

R-Squared

0.0444

0.0845

0.0582

0.0399

0.028

0.0611
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Table 9: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: average deposit rate (Adr)
In this table we present the results for the regression of average deposit rate on size, unemployment rate, per capita income,
delinquency ratio and a dummy variable for credit unions (dummy=0) and Subchapter S banks (dummy=1). We present the
results for each Individual year from 2005 to 2010. The following acronyms are used: Size (log (total assets)), Lpcir (log (per
capita income)), Urr (unemployment rate), and Delequencyratio (delinquent loans/total loans). *, ** and *** denote, respectively
10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Regression results for Adr
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Independent Variables:
Constant
Scode
Size
Urr
Lpcir
Delequencyratio

-0.0225**
0.0024***
0.0007***
0.0001
0.0025**
0.0002

-0.0324**
0.0048***
0.0012***
0.0002
0.0031**
0.0002

-0.0241
0.0049***
0.0014***
0.0007**
0.0022
0.0008

-0.0045
0.0011*
0.0004
0.0009***
0.0017
0.0013

0.0242
0
0.0004
0.0001
-0.0012
0.0003

0.0065
0.0015***
0.0001
0
0.0005
0.0007*

# of Obs

520

593

660

597

373

303

R-Squared

0.0752

0.139

0.1295

0.0373

0.0065

0.0407
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Table 10: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: Servefee
In this table we present the results for the regression of service fee on size, unemployment rate, per capita income, delinquency
ratio and a dummy variable for credit unions (dummy=0) and Subchapter S banks (dummy=1). We present the results for each
Individual year from 2005 to 2010. The following acronyms are used: Size (log (total assets)), Lpcir (log (per capita income)), Urr
(unemployment rate), and Delequencyratio (delinquent loans/total loans). *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1%
levels of significance.
Regression results for Servefee
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Independent Variables:
Constant
Scode
Size
Urr
Lpcir
Delequencyratio

0.1123***
-0.0092***
-0.0003
0.0007*
-0.009***
-0.0005

0.0799*
-0.0085***
0.001
0.0013
-0.0085**
-0.0002

0.0949***
-0.009***
0.0007
0
-0.0088***
-0.0013

0.091***
-0.0157***
-0.0003
-0.0002
-0.0064***
-0.0002

0.1095***
-0.011***
0
-0.0001
-0.0088***
-0.0005

0.1407***
-0.0109***
0
-0.0001
-0.0118***
-0.0003

# of Obs

520

593

660

597

373

303

R-Squared

0.2575

0.2677

0.0626

0.5452

0.3273

0.34
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Table 11: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: Wstexp
In this table we present the results for the regression of Wstexp on size, unemployment rate, per capita income, delinquency ratio
and a dummy variable for credit unions (dummy=0) and Subchapter S banks (dummy=1). We present the results for each
Individual year from 2005 to 2010. The following acronyms are used: Size (log (total assets)), Lpcir (log (per capita income)), Urr
(unemployment rate), and Delequencyratio (delinquent loans/total loans). *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1%
levels of significance.
Regression results for Wstexp
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Independent Variables:
Constant
Scode
Size
Urr
Lpcir
Delequencyratio

1.0923***
0.0073
-0.0082**
-0.0029
-0.0546***
-0.0224

0.9207***
-0.0131**
-0.01***
-0.003
-0.0373***
0.0012

0.8743***
-0.0093*
-0.0128***
-0.0058**
-0.0284***
-0.0095

0.9931***
0.0015
-0.0055*
-0.0101***
-0.0487***
-0.0139*

0.7726***
0.0034
-0.0039
-0.0027
-0.0315
-0.013**

0.6868***
0.0112
-0.0012
-0.0042**
-0.0261
-0.012**

# of Obs

520

593

660

597

373

303

R-Squared

0.0541

0.0427

0.0589

0.0638

0.0227

0.0364
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Table 12: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: Optexp
In this table we present the results for the regression of Optexp on size, unemployment rate, per capita income, delinquency ratio
and a dummy variable for credit unions (dummy=0) and Subchapter S banks (dummy=1). We present the results for each
Individual year from 2005 to 2010. The following acronyms are used: Size (log (total assets)), Lpcir (log (per capita income)), Urr
(unemployment rate), and Delequencyratio (delinquent loans/total loans). *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1%
levels of significance.
Regression results for Optexp
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Constant

0.4959***

0.4712***

0.4571***

0.4659***

0.3199**

0.3246*

Scode

-0.0795***

-0.0782***

-0.0734***

-0.0707***

-0.0665***

-0.0687***

Size

-0.0025

-0.0032*

-0.0044**

-0.0015

0.0013

0.0011

Urr

-0.0031

-0.0013

-0.0012

-0.0028**

0.0005

-0.0002

Lpcir

-0.0251***

-0.0236***

-0.0208**

-0.0256***

-0.0184

-0.0175

Delequencyratio

-0.0078

0.0032

-0.003

-0.0012

-0.0055

0.0003

# of Obs

520

593

660

597

373

303

R-Squared

0.4374

0.4687

0.4599

0.3999

0.3862

0.3926

Independent Variables:
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Table 13: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: return on equity
In this table we present the results for the regression of return on equity on size, unemployment rate, per capita income,
delinquency ratio and a dummy variable for credit unions (dummy=0) and Subchapter S banks (dummy=1). We present the
results for each Individual year from 2005 to 2010. The following acronyms are used: Size (log (total assets)), Lpcir (log (per
capita income)), Urr (unemployment rate), and Delequencyratio (delinquent loans/total loans). *, ** and *** denote, respectively
10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Regression results for Roe
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Constant

-0.0363

0.1567

0.2653**

0.421***

0.4386**

0.4646**

Scode

0.1002***

0.0997***

0.0815***

0.0561***

0.0345***

0.0403***

Size

0.0114***

0.0138***

0.0111***

0.0069***

0.0113***

0.0089***

Urr

-0.0009

-0.0072***

-0.0064**

-0.0076***

-0.0029*

-0.0034**

Lpcir

-0.0093

-0.0298***

-0.036***

-0.0425***

-0.0537***

-0.0518***

Delequencyratio

-0.0183

-0.0065

-0.0049

-0.0165**

-0.0081

0.0011

# of Obs

520

593

660

597

373

303

R-Squared

0.3982

0.4258

0.3427

0.2547

0.1357

0.1926

Independent Variables:
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Table 14: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: return on assets
In this table we present the results for the regression of return on assets on size, unemployment rate, per capita income,
delinquency ratio and a dummy variable for credit unions (dummy=0) and Subchapter S banks (dummy=1). We present the
results for each individual year from 2005 to 2010. The following acronyms are used: Size (log (total assets)), Lpcir (log (per
capita income)), Urr (unemployment rate), and Delequencyratio (delinquent loans/total loans). *, ** and *** denote, respectively
10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Regression results for Road
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Constant

-0.0219

-0.0013

0.0104

0.0363***

0.0421*

0.0382*

Scode

0.0082***

0.0086***

0.0068***

0.0043***

0.0033***

0.0036***

Size

0.0011***

0.0011***

0.0009***

0.0005*

0.0008**

0.0005

Independent Variables:

Urr

0.0001

-0.0005**

-0.0006*

-0.0006***

-0.0002

-0.0002

Lpcir

0.0009

-0.0008

-0.0016

-0.0033***

-0.0047**

-0.0038**

Delequencyratio

-0.0004

-0.0009

0.0003

-0.001

-0.0008

0.0004

# of Obs

520

593

660

597

373

303

R-Squared

0.2861

0.3027

0.2358

0.1662

0.0979

0.1313
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CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3
ASSET QUALITY COMPARISON BETWEEN CREDIT UNIONS AND
SUBCHAPTER S BANKS

4.1. Introduction
Performance of any banking institution depends on the quality of the assets. The
financial crisis during 2008-2009 has been marked by an overwhelming decrease in
banking industry profits and a large number of bank failures. The series of bank failure
not only shatters the public confidence in the banking system but also depletes the
resources of the insurance fund provided by the FDIC. According to Knaup and Wagner
(2009) asset quality indicators help supervisors and regulators to monitor and identify
weak banks and put them under increased scrutiny. In fact, the asset quality of financial
institutions has gained increased scrutiny in the wake of recent financial crisis.
In essay 2 we have compared not for profit credit unions with for profit
Subchapter S banks to investigate which of the two is doing a better job of sharing the tax
benefit with its customers. We find that in comparison with credit unions, the Subchapter
S banks are doing a superior job at sharing the tax benefit with their customers.
In this essay we further hypothesize that the difference in the ownership structure
and objectives of the credit unions and the Subchapter S banks may influence the asset
quality of these financial institutions and we specifically investigate which of the two has
better asset quality in the post crisis period. However, a priori, we do not have any
evidence or economic rationale to argue in favor of one or the other except that the credit
unions could end up with poor asset quality as they serve the individuals of limited means
whereas the Subchapter S banks could make risky loans to maximize the profits. Based
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on this argument alone, one can rationalize that credit unions will have relatively poor
asset utilization.
The credit unions are member owned whereas the Subchapter S banks are
privately owned by the shareholders of the bank. The federal credit unions are exempted
from federal and state income taxes and do not pay taxes on their retained earnings as
well. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 allows Subchapter S banks to avoid
double taxation just like credit unions. However, the shareholders of the Subchapter S
banks have to pay taxes on the retained earnings. The credit union industry has
cooperative not for profit structure and has a special objective of serving individuals of
limited means whereas; the objective of privately owned Subchapter S banks is to
maximize shareholder’s wealth while serving the community. The supporters of tax
exemption to credit unions argue that credit unions have provided a valuable alternative
to for profit banking system and serves people who have no or limited access to other
financial services14 . The financial crisis of 2008-09 has affected the asset quality of
financial institutions including credit unions and Subchapter S banks. Therefore, we use
data for the year 2010 to compare the asset quality of credit unions and Subchapter S
banks in the post financial crisis period.
In this essay we use three different measures of asset quality to compare credit
unions with Subchapter S banks. These asset quality measures are; (1) allowance for loan
losses as a percentage of total loans (Alll); (2) net charge-offs as a percentage of average
assets (Nco) and; (3) non-performing assets as a percentage of total assets (Npata). The
14

. U.S. Department of the Treasury “Comparing Credit Unions and Other Depository Institutions”,
January 2001. Page 28.)
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allowance for loan losses is an estimate of the amount of losses that are likely to result
from all of the loans in the bank’s portfolio. According to Walter (1991), FDIC (Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation) requires that all financial institutions including credit
unions and Subchapter S banks report allowance for loan losses as a contra asset account
on their balance sheets. The net charge-off is the difference between gross charge-off and
any subsequent recoveries of delinquent loans that were previously classified as
uncollectible. The bad debt is written off by the bank and is classified as gross chargeoffs. However, if there is a recovery on previously written off debt, it is subtracted from
the gross charge-off to compute net charge-off. The non-performing assets include nonperforming loans and other assets that banks have taken possession typically through
foreclosure.
As a robustness test we use net interest margin (Nim) as an indirect measure of
asset quality and compare credit unions and Subchapter S banks. Financial institutions
with risky assets are expected to generate higher revenues in the form of interest income
which may lead to higher net interest margin. The net interest margin is defined as the
difference between revenue and financial costs as a percentage of average earning assets
and has a negative relationship with asset quality.
We also compare the asset utilization at credit unions and Subchapter S banks to
investigate which of the two is putting its assets to better use. We measure the asset
utilization by comparing the total loans made as a percentage of total assets. We find that
the Subchapter S banks have higher allowance for loans and lease losses (Alll) but there
is no significant difference in net charge-off (Nco) at the two institutions. We find that
Subchapter S banks have higher non-performing assets (Npata). We find that the asset
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utilization measured by total loans as a percentage of total assets (Tlta) is higher at
Subchapter S banks and net interest margin (Nim) is also higher at Subchapter S banks.
Overall, we find that Subchapter S banks have poorer asset quality but they are doing a
better job at utilizing assets and generating higher revenues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide the
relevant literature and discuss the research questions. In section 3, we present the details
about the sample construction and variables of interest. In section 4, we present the
methodology. In section 5, we present the results. In section 6, we present the conclusion.
4.2. Literature Review
There is an extensive work done on the asset quality of financial institutions and
researchers have also investigated the determinants of this asset quality. Clair (1992)
analyzes the relationship between loan quality and loan growth at Texas banks using the
data from 1976 to 1990. He estimated the loan quality using non-performing loan ratios
and charge-off rates. He finds a negative influence of loan growth on non-performing
loans and the loan charge-off rate for the first year after a bank’s credit expansion,
whereas relationship was weaker for Subsequent years. He suggests that the relationship
between loan growth and loan quality deterioration appears to depend on a bank's equity
position.
Research in the past has also focused on the information advantage hypothesis
(IAH). The IAH posits that the small community banks have an information advantage in
evaluating and monitoring loan quality. Nakamura (1994) finds that the small banks have
a better organizational structure that gives them an edge in processing information over
large banks with respect to loans offered to small businesses. This is attributed to a closer
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relationship between the small businesses and the loan officers. Moreover, the loan
officers at small banks have better access to confidential information about the financial
activities of the borrowing firm which helps in better monitoring of the loans and better
asset quality.
Angbanzo (1997) used the Bank Call Report data from 1989 to 1993 to
investigate if the banks with riskier loans and higher interest-rate risk exposure strive to
achieve higher net interest margins. He finds that the interest margins reflect default and
interest rate risk premium.
Akhigbe, McNulty and Verbrugge (2001) investigate the loan quality at small
banks in the deregulated environment. They investigate and compare the loan quality at
small banks from 1986 to 1996 for all Florida banks. They define a bank as small if the
assets of the bank are under $500 million. They compare four different loan quality
measures and did not find systematic evidence that loan quality is better at small banks.
Specifically, they find that net charge-offs and loan loss provisions are lower at small
banks located in non-metropolitan areas. However they find that non-performing loans
and other real estate owned are higher at small banks.
Frame, Karels and McClatchey (2001) evaluate the effect of the common bond
and membership expansion on credit union risk using data from the 1997 Call and
Income Reports. They classify federal credit unions on the basis of common bond of
occupation, association, or geographic area. It is interesting to note that the membership
at credit unions is based on affinity among members or a common bond. The membership
at occupational credit unions is limited to individuals sharing a common employer, the
members of associational credit unions include members of a religious group or a civic
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group and the membership at residential or community credit unions is limited to
individuals of a particular residential area or community. They find that asset quality at
occupational credit unions is better perhaps because their members are employed and
they have informational advantages and better monitoring mechanism. They compared
asset quality within the credit unions whereas our study extends the asset quality
comparison of credit unions with Subchapter S banks.
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) analyzed bank loan loss provisioning at large
commercial banks from 45 countries during the period 1988–1999. They find that there is
a delay at many banks when it comes to provisioning for bad loans which might magnify
the impact of the economic cycle on banks’ income and capital. They also find that
bank’s provision for loan losses are too little in good times of the economic cycle and
banks overreact in bad times.
Researchers in the past have focused on different aspects of asset quality. They
have investigated the impact of factors like size, loan growth, economic cycle,
informational advantage, etc. on asset quality of financial institutions and all of the
studies cited above have used the pre financial crisis data. The financial crisis of 2008-09
has severely affected the asset quality at financial institutions as a result of subprime
mortgages and other bad loans. In this study, we use the data from post financial crisis
period to compare the asset quality of credit unions and Subchapter S banks which have
similar tax exemptions but different objectives and ownership structure.
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4.3. Data
Our sample consists of federally chartered credit unions and Subchapter S banks
for the year 2010. We collect the data on Subchapter S banks from Highline Financial
database and the data for credit unions from the website of National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA). Highline financials is the comprehensive database, which
provides detail financial information for financial institutions including commercial
banks and bank holding companies. A number of credit unions are small without a
comparable Subchapter S bank and some credit unions are bigger than a comparable
Subchapter S bank, so we delete institutions below $50 million and above $3 billion from
the sample.
We collect all the relevant data from the following sources;
1. per capita income by county from the website of the US Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
2. unemployment rate from the website of US Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
The following is the description of variables used in this study:
•

Size = log of total assets

•

Alll = allowance for loan losses as a percentage of total loans

•

Nco = net charge-offs as a percentage of average assets

•

Npata = non-performing assets as a percentage of total assets

•

Tlta = total loans as a percentage of total assets

•

Nim = net interest margin

•

Urr = the unemployment rate of county in which bank is located

•

Lpcir = the log of per capita income of the county in which bank is located
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•

Scode (dummy variable) = 1 if bank is Subchapter S, 0 otherwise

4.4. Methodology
We use the annual data for the Subchapter S banks and credit unions for the year
2010 for our empirical analysis. We perform both univariate analysis as well as
multivariate regressions.
Univariate Analysis:
Our goal is to test if the relevant attributes for the credit unions ( μ1 ) are different
from the corresponding attributes of the Subchapter S banks ( μ 2 ). Hence we test the
following null-hypothesis:
∶

0,

∶

0.

Against the alternative hypothesis:

We first determine whether the population variances are statistically equal using
the Snedecor’s F-test. If we find that the population variances are statistically same then
we use the standard two-independent sample t-test to test the null hypothesis posited
above.15 If, we find that the population variances are statistically unequal, we use the two
independent sample t-test for equality of population means proposed by Satterthwaite

15

For the test statistics and procedures to test the equality of two population variances and the equality of
two population means when population variances are unknown but equal see any basic standard statistics
textbook.
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(1946). If the null hypothesis is true, the t-statistic will have Student’s t-distribution with
Welch’s (1947) “modified” degrees of freedom given by,
2

 s12 s 22 
 + 
 n1 n2 
df =
2
s12 n1
s2 n
+ 2 2
n1
n2

(

) (

)

2

Where ni and s i2 (i = 1,2) respectively are the sample size and the sample variance of the

ith sample.
Multivariate Analysis:
Following Mayne (1977) and Thomson (1991), in our multivariate analysis, we
use county unemployment rate and the per-capita income to control for local economic
factors. Furthermore, we control for the size of credit unions and the Subchapter S banks
because economies of scale are experienced by banks and credit unions as they grow
larger. Moreover large credit unions and Subchapter S banks are likely to be raise funds
in the money markets, and markets respond favorably to lower non-performing loans
which motivates banks to charge-off bad loans rather than carry them as non-performing
assets. Therefore, large financial institutions have an incentive to charge-off troubled
loans to gain more favorable access to money markets.
In equations (4.1) to (4.5) we regress a particular dependent variable on over a
dummy variable Scode which takes a value of 0 for credit unions and a value of 1 for
Subchapter S banks as well as other independent variables e.g., Size, Urr, and Lpcir. Our
variable of interest is the sign and statistical significance of the dummy variable Scode in
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each case whereas the other variables are the control variables. We use three different
measures of loan quality as the dependent variables to compare the asset quality of the
credit unions with Subchapter S banks. So we have three different models to compare the
asset quality (equation 4.1 to equation 4.3) of credit unions and Subchapter S banks. For
example, in equation (4.1) we investigate the significance of the dummy variable Scode.
A positive and significant coefficient on Scode would indicate that the Alll for the
Subchapter S bank is higher. Similarly in (equation 4.2), a positive and significant
coefficient on Scode would indicate that the Nco for the Subchapter S bank is higher and
in (equation 4.3), a positive and significant coefficient on Scode would indicate that the
Npata for the Subchapter S bank is higher.

Alll = α + β1Scode + β 2 Size + β3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + ε
Nco = α + β1Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + ε
Npata = α + β1Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + ε

(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)

We use equation (4.4) to analyze whether credit unions or Subchapter S banks are
doing a better job of putting assets to good use. A positive and significant coefficient on
Scode would indicate that the asset utilization for the credit unions is lower.

Tlta = α + β1Scode + β 2 Size + β 3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + ε

(4.4)

We use equation (4.5) to compare the profitability of borrowing and lending activities at
credit unions and Subchapter S banks. A positive and significant coefficient on Scode
would indicate lower interest margin for the credit unions.

Nim = α + β1Scode + β 2 Size + β3Urr + β 4 Lpcir + ε
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(4.5)

4.5. Results and Analysis
In Table 15, we present the univariate analysis of the variables of interest for the
credit unions and Subchapter S banks. We find that the allowance for loan loss as a
percentage of total loans (Alll) is higher for Subchapter S banks. We find that net chargeoff as a percentage of average assets (Nco) are higher for credit unions. The nonperforming assets as a percentage of total assets (Npata) are also significantly higher for
Subchapter S banks. The univariate results hints at better asset utilization by Subchapter
S banks as the total loans and leases as a percentage of total assets (Tlta) is significantly
higher for Subchapter S banks. The profitability of the borrowing and lending activities is
higher at Subchapter S banks as the net interest margin (Nim) is significantly higher for
Subchapter S banks as compared to credit unions.
In Table 16, we present the results of the regression analysis on Alll (Allowance
for loan losses as a percentage of total loans). We find the coefficient on Scode to be
positive and significant in Alll regression (equation 4.1), indicating that Subchapter S
banks have higher allowance for loan losses as compared to credit unions. The positive
and a significant coefficient on Size show that allowance for loan losses increases as the
size of the bank/credit union increases.
In Table 17, we present the results of the regression analysis on Nco (Net chargeoffs as a percentage of average assets). We find the coefficient on Scode is not significant
for the Nco regression (equation4.2), indicating that there is no significant difference in
net charge-off for the Subchapter S banks and credit unions.
In Table 18, we present the results of the regression analysis on Npata (Nonperforming assets as a percentage of total assets). We find the coefficient on Scode to be
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positive and significant for the regression (equation 4.3), indicating that Subchapter S
banks have higher non-performing assets as compared to credit unions.
In Table 19, we present the results of the regression analysis on Tlta (Total loans
and leases as a percentage of total assets). The coefficient on Scode is positive and
significant for Tlta regression (equation 4.4) which indicates that Subchapter S banks
have better asset utilization as compared to credit unions.
Finally, in Table 20, we present the results of the regression analysis on Nim (Net
interest Margin). We regress Nim on the Scode dummy and the set of control variables
(equation 4.5). We find that the coefficient on Scode is positive and highly significant.
The regression results indicate that the net interest margin for the credit unions is
significantly less than that for Subchapter S banks.
Our results indicate that Subchapter S banks have higher allowance for loan losses
as a percentage of total loans (Alll). However, we find no significant difference between
the net charge-off (Nco). We find that Subchapter S banks have higher non-performing
assets as a percentage of total assets (Npata). We also find that Subchapter S banks have
better asset utilization indicated by total loans as a percentage of total assets (Tlta) and
also have higher net interest margin (Nim) as compared to credit unions.
4.6. Conclusion
In this essay, we compare the asset quality of not for profit credit unions with for
profit Subchapter S banks to investigate which of the two has better asset quality in the
post crisis period. We use allowance for loan losses as a percentage of total loans (Alll),
net charge-off as a percentage of average assets (Nco) and non-performing assets as a
percentage of total assets (Npata) to compare the asset quality of credit unions and
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Subchapter S banks. We find that the Subchapter S banks have higher allowances for
loan losses to avoid financial distress but net charge-off is not significantly different from
credit unions. The non-performing assets are higher at Subchapter S banks indicating that
overall loan quality may be poor at Subchapter S banks. Subchapter S banks have better
asset utilization as indicated by total loans as a percentage of total assets (Tlta) and also
have higher net interest margin (Nim). Overall, we find that credit unions have a better
asset quality but Subchapter S banks are superior in utilizing assets and generating higher
net interest margin.

68

Table 15: Asset quality of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: univariate analysis
The table shows the mean and standard deviation of selected variables for the year 2010
for the complete sample of credit unions and Subchapter S banks. The results of t-tests on
the differences in the means of the variables of interest are presented; *, ** and ***
denote significant differences between the samples means at respectively 10%, 5% and
1% levels of significance.
Subchapter S
banks

Credit unions
Variable

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Diff

pvalue

Tlta
Npata
Alll
Nco
Nim

58.1483
1.0748
1.2835
0.8960
3.5998

15.1785
1.1321
1.1328
0.8511
0.8332

63.1209
3.0207
1.7435
0.7896
4.1235

14.2202
3.8434
0.9277
0.9959
0.8174

-4.9726***
-1.9459***
-0.46***
0.1064***
-0.5238***

0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0019
0.0001

Number of banks

1177

1800

Description of variables:
Tlta = total loans as a percentage of total assets
Npata = non-performing assets as a percentage of total assets
Alll = allowance for loan losses as a percentage of total loans
Nco = net charge-offs as a percentage of average assets
Nim = net interest margin
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Table 16: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: Alll regression
This table presents the regression coefficients on selected variables as well as their
significance on the sample of credit unions and Subchapter S banks. The independent
variables are used to control for firm size, unemployment rate and per capita income. The
variable of interest is the Scode dummy, which takes value of 1 for Subchapter S banks,
and of 0 for credit unions. *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1% levels of
significance.
Variable
Constant***
Scode***

Std
Error

Estimate

t-value

-9.6148
0.6650

1.0333
0.0404

Size***

0.1090

0.0217

5.0211

1.0169

Urr***

0.0936

0.0077

12.2256

1.1925

Lpcir***

0.7522

0.0921

8.1688

1.2823

Number of observations
R-Squared

-9.3051
16.4514

VIF
0.0000
1.2004

2942
0.1113

Description of variables:
Alll = allowance for loan losses as a percentage of total loans
Scode = dummy variable (a value of 0 for credit unions and 1 for Subchapter S banks)
Size = log of total assets
Urr = unemployment rate
Lpcir = log of per capita income
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Table 17: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: Nco regression
This table presents the regression coefficients on selected variables as well as their
significance on the sample of credit unions and Subchapter S banks. The independent
variables are used to control for firm size, unemployment rate and per capita income. The
variable of interest is the Scode dummy, which takes value of 1 for Subchapter S banks,
and of 0 for credit unions. *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1% levels of
significance.
Variable
Constant***
Scode
Size***
Urr***
Lpcir***

Estimate

Std Error

-7.9605
0.0611
0.1047
0.0811
0.5780

Number of observations
R-Squared

0.9639
0.0377
0.0203
0.0071
0.0859

t-value
-8.2590
1.6189
5.1692
11.3519
6.7290

VIF
0.0000
1.2000
1.0170
1.1923
1.2819

2943
0.0581

Description of variables:
Nco = net charge-off as a percentage of total loans
Scode = dummy variable (a value of 0 for credit unions and 1 for Subchapter S banks)
Size = log of total assets
Urr = unemployment rate
Lpcir = log of per capita income
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Table 18: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: Npata regression
This table presents the regression coefficients on selected variables as well as their
significance on the sample of credit unions and Subchapter S banks. The independent
variables are used to control for firm size, unemployment rate and per capita income. The
variable of interest is the Scode dummy, which takes value of 1 for Subchapter S banks,
and of 0 for credit unions. *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1% levels of
significance.
Variable
Constant***
Scode***
Size***
Urr***
Lpcir***

Estimate

Std Error

-23.8801
2.4134
0.2831
0.2524
1.6317

Number of observations
R-Squared

3.1931
0.1249
0.0671
0.0237
0.2846

t-value
-7.4787
19.3176
4.2179
10.6647
5.7340

VIF
0.0000
1.2000
1.0170
1.1923
1.2819

2943
0.1291

Description of variables:
Npata = non-performing Asset as percentage of total assets
Scode = dummy variable (a value of 0 for credit unions and 1 for Subchapter S banks)
Size = log of total assets
Urr = unemployment rate
Lpcir = log of per capita income
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Table 19: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: Tlta regression
This table presents the regression coefficients on selected variables as well as their
significance on the sample of credit unions and Subchapter S banks. The independent
variables are used to control for firm size, unemployment rate and per capita income. The
variable of interest is the Scode dummy, which takes value of 1 for Subchapter S banks,
and of 0 for credit unions. *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1% levels of
significance.
Variable

Estimate

Constant***

Std Error

t-value

VIF

47.6369

15.3053

3.1124

0.0000

Scode***

4.5549

0.5988

7.6062

1.2000

Size***

2.1436

0.3217

6.6636

1.0170

Urr

-0.0688

0.1134

-0.6066

1.1923

Lpcir**

-2.7721

1.3640

-2.0324

1.2819

Number of observations
R-Squared

2943
0.0421

Description of variables:
Tlta = total loans as a percentage of total assets
Scode = dummy variable (a value of 0 for credit unions and 1 for Subchapter S banks)
Size = log of total assets
Urr = unemployment rate
Lpcir = log of per capita income
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Table 20: Comparison of credit unions and Subchapter S banks: Nim regression
This table presents the regression coefficients on selected variables as well as their
significance on the sample of credit unions and Subchapter S banks. The independent
variables are used to control for firm size, unemployment rate and per capita income. The
variable of interest is the Scode dummy, which takes value of 1 for Subchapter S banks,
and of 0 for Credit Unions. *, ** and *** denote, respectively 10%, 5% and 1% levels of
significance.
Variable

Estimate

Constant***
Scode***
Size***
Urr***
Lpcir***

12.1653
0.4171
-0.0960
-0.0234
-0.6177

Number of observations
R-Squared

Std Error

t-value

VIF

0.8572
0.0335
0.0180
0.0064
0.0764

14.1913
12.4371
-5.3279
-3.6805
-8.0851

0.0000
1.2000
1.0170
1.1923
1.2819

2943
0.1195

Description of variables:
Nim = net Interest Margin
Scode = dummy variable (a value of 0 for credit unions and 1 for Subchapter S banks)
Size = log of total assets
Urr = unemployment rate
Lpcir = log of per capita income
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The credit unions and Subchapter S banks are both exempted from federal
taxation at corporate level and these tax exemptions have resulted in the loss of revenues
to the government and therefore it becomes economically important to investigate the
effect of tax exemptions. The dissertation investigates the effect of tax exemption on
competitiveness, performance and portfolio risk of credit unions and Subchapter S banks.
The first essay of this dissertation investigates the effect of bank’s adoption of the
Subchapter S status on its stakeholders. We find that the customers of the Subchapter S
banks which comprises of the depositors and the borrowers do not receive the benefits of
tax exemption in the form of higher deposit rates or lower loan rates. The employees of
the bank are not benefitted as they do not receive higher salaries and benefits after the
adoption of Subchapter S status. The sole beneficiaries of the tax benefit are the owners
or the shareholders of the bank as return on equity is significantly higher after the
adoption of Subchapter S status. Interestingly enough, the tax exemptions to Subchapter
S banks do not lead to higher employment opportunities at banks that adopt Subchapter S
status. The findings will have significant policy implications about the ongoing debate if
tax exemptions to businesses create jobs.
The second essay extends the analysis to credit unions which receive a larger tax
benefit as they do not pay taxes on retained earnings. In this essay we compare member
owned not for profit credit unions with privately owned for profit Subchapter S banks to
investigate which of the two is doing a better job of sharing the tax benefit with its
customers. The analyses are conducted for the combined period from 2005- 2010 and
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also for each of the individual years separately. We find that the credit unions are not
doing a better job at sharing tax benefit with its customers. The results indicate that credit
unions do not offer lower loan rates to borrowers or higher deposit rates to depositors as
compared to Subchapter S banks. Moreover the credit union customers pay a higher
service fee as compared to the customers of Subchapter S banks. We find that the
operating expenses are higher for credit unions. We also find that the return on equity and
the return on assets are significantly higher for Subchapter S banks as compared to credit
unions indicating inefficient operations. Overall we find that in comparison with credit
unions, the Subchapter S banks are doing a better job of sharing the tax benefit with its
customers.
The third essay compares the asset quality of not for profit credit unions with for
profit Subchapter S banks in the post crisis period. The tax exemptions may affect the
asset quality of both credit unions and Subchapter S banks as credit unions are not for
profit organizations and the objective is to serve the individuals of limited means, on the
other hand Subchapter S banks are privately owned and may make decisions including
making risky loans to maximize the shareholders wealth. We find that the Subchapter S
banks have higher allowances for loan losses to avoid financial distress but net charge-off
is not significantly different from credit unions. The non-performing assets are higher at
Subchapter S banks indicating that overall loan quality may be poor at Subchapter S
banks. Subchapter S banks have better asset utilization as indicated by total loans as a
percentage of total assets and also have higher net interest margin. Overall, we find that
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credit unions have a better asset quality but Subchapter S banks are superior in utilizing
assets and generating higher net interest margin.
The empirical findings of this dissertation have important policy implications.
The results indicate that tax exemptions have resulted in “fattening the wallets” of the
owners of the Subchapter S banks and inefficient operations at credit unions without any
societal benefits as a whole, and these tax exemptions contribute to the so called one of
the many tax loop-holes.
The findings of the dissertation have significant policy implications about the
ongoing debate if tax exemptions to Subchapter S banks and credit unions are justified or
create any value particularly in times of record budget deficits. The findings are also
expected to extend the current knowledge on the effect of tax exemptions on the
stakeholders, job creation, performance and portfolio risk of Subchapter S banks and
credit unions.
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